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Abstract. The aim of the paper is the presentation of the main reasons of Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s 
atheism and an interpretation of his position in terms of the conceptual apparatus used in 
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It is a well known fact that Tadeusz Kotarbiński proclaimed atheism as a 
metaphysical thesis, saying that there is no God (KOTARBIŃSKI [1962], p. 9). 
He regarded a belief that God exists as false and irrational (KOTARBIŃSKI 
[1962], p. 13). In consequence, he also regarded as false and irrational other 
religious beliefs such as, the belief that God is a guardian of all people and 
animals or that there is an afterlife. He called such beliefs “phantasms”, 
“daydreams of a sick imagination”, “obvious untruths” (KOTARBIŃSKI 
[1962]). Kotarbiński’s atheism was not a result of long-lasting considerations, 
since he accepted this view as a very young man and he defended it in all 
his writings. Therefore, we cannot say that Kotarbiński’s atheism was 
a consequence of his reism. On the contrary, reism formulated in terms of 
pansomatism was consistent with atheism, which rejects the existence of any 
spiritual beings. Kotarbiński’s atheism was nota conclusion drawn from ethical 
considerations either. Kotarbiński never claimed that morality based on the 
Christian religion was inconsistent with human nature or was incompatible with 
human conscience. Neither was his atheism a product of an anticlerical attitude 
or a result of disappointment understood as a subjective response to the history 
of religion, the Church and Christianity. So why was Kotarbiński an atheist?
The first reason for his atheism was his conviction about the irrationality of 
religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are irrational because they are inconsistent 
with the scientific knowledge about the world. It is not religion but science 
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(cosmology, physics and biology) which explains the origins of humankind and 
the universe (KOTARBIŃSKI [1970], pp. 376–377). When describing his turn 
from a religious world-view which took place in his youth, Kotarbiński wrote:
There is no God who takes care of people. They are left alone like all products of 
nature which came into being as a result of the evolution of our animal ancestors 
(KOTARBIŃSKI [1962], p. 10).1
Darwin’s theory of evolution and its philosophical consequences were 
particularly important for Kotarbiński’s disbelief in a religious explanation of 
human origins. He stated that: 
The achievements of biological evolutionism radically changed the system of 
values held by people thinking philosophically. Man could no longer feel like 
God’s child, a reflection of God, a noble being who is in control of all other 
beings according to the will of the Almighty. Human faith in such a leadership 
collapsed because the subtle forms of structural and functional adaptations of 
plants and animals, which had induced an illusory idea of the divine providence 
taking care of every creature turned out to be a product of chance, mechanical 
adaptation, mutual relations of organisms with their environment, and a struggle 
for survival. In brief, all these facts provided evidence against the existence of any 
sympathetic cosmic guardianship. The illusion of the harmony of the world 
disappeared. The world has turned out to be a place of a mortal combat between 
species, and among individuals of one species (KOTARBIŃSKI [1970], p. 376). 
The second reason for Kotarbiński’s disbelief in God, already mentioned, was 
axiological, i.e. the existence of enormous evil and suffering in the world. There 
is a very well-known aphorism by Kotarbiński (reapeted after Stendhal) saying 
that: 
If there is so much evil in the world, it would be a blasphemy against God to 
believe in his existence (KOTARBIŃSKI [1986b]).2
It is worth noting that Kotarbiński was sensitive not only to human suffering, but 
also to the suffering of animals (including animal suffering caused by humans). 
The third reason, let us name it “theological reason”, was an argument from 
religious fatalism, i.e., the incomapatibility of divine omnipotence with human 
freedom and moral responsibility. The argument consists in the claim that if 
there were an omnipotent being which decreed in the past what and in which 
way things would happen in the future (acts of human will and all beliefs 
1 See also: KOTARBIŃSKI [1986a], p. 363.
2 We find in his notebook written during the Second World War another aphorism which he 
himself regarded as a synthesis of all syntheses saying in Polish that “życie jest to bycie połączone 
z wyciem”, and which could be translated in a free way as meaning that “to live means to scream” 
(KOTARBIŃSKI [1970], p. 438).
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included), then the freedom of will of all created agents would be impossible 
(KOTARBIŃSKI [1986a], p. 226).
Thus, atheism in his opinion and for him was a true and rational belief, i.e., 
a sufficiently justified belief. Atheism was also coherent with his other semantic 
and metaphysical doctrines. Therefore, we are allowed to state that atheism was 
deeply rooted in Kotarbiński’s philosophy. His atheism was not, of course, the 
main and most original of his philosophical achievements but he was probably 
the member of the Lvov–Warsaw School who declared his atheism most firmly 
and clearly (perhaps apart from Władysław Witwicki). Let us note here that 
other eminent representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, such as Kazimierz 
Twardowski, Jan Łukasiewicz and the so called Cracow Circle (Bocheński, 
Drewnowski, Salamucha and Sobociński), rejected atheism. Twardowski 
subscribed to a form of deism, Łukasiewicz defended nonorthodox Catholicism, 
and the members of the Cracow Circle started a new type of Thomism based on 
mathematical logic and logical analyses. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz 
Czeżowski – also Twardowski’s disciples – represented an agnostic attitude.  
Let us now consider the question of what Kotarbiński’s atheism was like. I will 
not discuss here whether his atheism and arguments for it provided by him are 
fully convincing and cannot be refuted or at least partly weakened. I will rather 
try to analyse Kotarbiński’s atheism with regard to its relation to theistic beliefs. 
As the starting point, I will resort to a typology of various forms of atheism 
proposed in 1979 by the atheist William Rowe. According to Rowe’s typology, 
we can distinguish three forms of atheism: 
(a) A friendly atheism, which is a view (i) holding atheism to be true 
and (ii) holding that some theists may be rational in respect of their 
belief in God 
(b) An indifferent atheism, which is a view (i) holding atheism to be 
true and (ii) being indifferent concerning whether or not theists are 
rational in respect of their belief in God. 
(c) An unfriendly atheism, which is a view (i) holding atheism to be 
true and (ii) holding that no theist is rational in respect of their belief 
in God (Rowe 1979, 340). 
We should keep in mind, however, that rationality is understood here in 
a deontological sense; namely, a given person is rationally justified to believe p
if that person is blameless and has not violated his epistemic duties by believing 
p. Such a concept of rationality was not in use among the members of the Lvov–
Warsaw School, but it seems that it is compatible with the concept of logical 
rationality typical of the School. According to the logical rationalism held by the 
representatives of the School, beliefs are logically rational if they are sufficiently 
justified, i.e., if there exist empirical reasons (evidence) or inferential arguments 
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supporting them. Now, it seems that logical rationality can be part of the 
epistemic duties of a given person: anyone who subscribes to logical rationality 
has a duty to accept only such beliefs which are formulated in a way which is 
semantically correct and for which there exists some empirical evidence or an 
inferential argument. Anyone is epistemically blameless who did not make 
a mistake deliberately. 
Let us consider Rowe’s friendly atheism in more detail. Friendly atheism allows 
us to assume that a theist or a believer may be rational while believing in God 
because 
(1) he lacks evidence for atheism 
or 
(2) he is mistaken regarding the evidential force of the arguments for 
theism. 
If either of the two cases above is present, a theist is making a mistake, and if he 
is making a mistake he is blameworthy for making a mistake. But friendly 
atheism allows for the rationality of beliefs when a believer expresses his beliefs 
in an understandable way (so that an atheist can discuss and refute them as false) 
and if he is arguing for theism in an argumentative way. 
It is worth noting here that friendly atheism can be even turned into an even 
more friendly form of atheism than just friendly atheism is. Thus, in regard to 
case (1), when a theist lacks evidence for atheism, he is not necessarily 
blameworthy for his mistake. On the contrary, a believer can be rational and 
blameless. Such an evaluation is possible if we accept a modest version of 
evidentialism claiming that beliefs are rational if they are formed in accordance 
with the evidence one currently has. A theist – given the evidence he has at 
a particular moment in time – can rationally believe that theism is true or more 
probable than atheism. However, if we accept a radical or strong version of 
evidentialism, we are allowed to claim that a believer is irrational, which means 
that he is responsible for his mistake. It is so because a theist should strive for 
the broadening of his thought-horizon and gather more evidence over time. 
Thus, a theist can be rational in a synchronic sense by believing in accordance 
with the evidence he currently has, and he can be irrational in a diachronic sense 
because he has failed to gather more evidence than he currently has (JONBÄCK 
[2015]). It is, however, disputable whether a theist always has the duty to look 
for further evidence and whether he is always irrational and blameworthy if he 
fails to do so. Our evaluation of such behaviour depends on a given situation. 
A theist can be in a position which makes it difficult or even impossible together 
more evidence over time. He could have other obligations, more important ones, 
for example parental care. Such a person can be rational when believing in God 
although he does not have enough knowledge about atheism and he does not 
look for further evidence for atheism or theism. Of, course we could claim that 
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such a theist, say, a non-reflective theist, in such a situation should withhold his 
religious beliefs until he has gathered evidence for or against theism (Jonbäck 
2015). If a theist does not withhold his beliefs, he makes an epistemic mistake 
for which he is blameworthy. But let us note that a theist is blameworthy for 
making a mistake only if he has direct voluntary control over his belief in God. 
The point now is that he may not have any control over his religious beliefs. It is 
possible that a belief in God has the same epistemic nature as the belief that 
Paris is the capital of France. If this is the case, a theist cannot stop believing in 
God as he cannot stop believing that Paris is the capital of France. Then, it seems 
that a believer cannot be regarded as an irrational person who is blameworthy 
because he did not withhold his belief in God. Such a modified version of the 
friendly atheism is called a “very friendly atheism” (JONBÄCK [2015]).
And we may also consider the second possibility (2) which says that a theist may 
be rational in his belief but is mistaken regarding the evidential force of 
the arguments for theism. Such a theist, say, a reflective theist, knows all the 
evidence and reasons for theism which are available at a given moment. It is also 
possible in this case to claim that a theist is not blameworthy in spite of his 
mistaken evaluation of all evidence and arguments both for theism and atheism.  
But there is still another epistemological possibility which is currently in the 
debate over the rationality of religious beliefs, according to which a reflective 
theist can regard correctly the evidence for atheism as convincing and yet be 
considered rational in believing in God (JONBÄCK [2015]). In this case, the 
reflective theist cannot resort to the classical arguments for theism. However, he 
can resort to a meta-epistemological consideration. He can be rational in his 
believing in the truth of: 
(3) The belief that God exists constitutes knowledge. 
In other words, he can believe that a belief that God exists is a typical case of 
knowledge. He can resort to – as Roderick Chisolm named it – epistemological 
particularism and not to epistemological methodism. Richard Fumerton has 
recently described these two positions quite aptly, so let me quote it: 
Does one first decide what one knows and then try to learn from paradigmatic 
examples of knowledge the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge? Or 
does one discover first the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and 
apply what one learns to discover what one knows? (Fumerton 2008, 36). 
If we assume that neither particularism nor methodism are obviously true 
positions, it is quite rational to opt for one or the other. For a proponent of 
particularism, a typical way of choosing a particular case of knowledge as 
paradigmatic for knowledge is to appeal to intuition (JONBÄCK [2015]). If 
a believer (a theist) grew up in a theistic community, he might very well have 
the intuition that God exists, and therefore his believing in God is rational and 
blameless. The atheism claiming that reflective theists can be rational and 
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blameless in believing in God because they resort to particularism and regard the 
belief that God exists as a paradigmatic example of knowledge, is a “very, very 
friendly atheism” (JONBÄCK [2015], p. 70).
Thus, we have now a look at some possible forms of atheism and we can ask 
which of them is consistent with Kotarbiński’s position – if any. It seems that, 
from Kotarbiński’s point of view, indifferent atheism cannot be accepted. If you 
are a proponent of a universal, overwhelming care, as Kotarbiński was, then it 
makes a difference what kind of beliefs other people have: rational or irrational. 
It has special importance because rationality of beliefs and actions is much more 
valuable than irrationality of beliefs and actions. 
Thus, could we classify his atheism as an unfriendly atheism in the sense 
exposed above? It seems that Kotarbiński’s atheism was a form of unfriendly 
atheism since he regarded religious beliefs as irrational. But perhaps it would be 
a good thing to ask at this point whether there are any reasons for a less 
categorical answer to the last question. 
So, firstly, let us observe that beliefs (religious beliefs included) are always 
beliefs of real persons or, to put it in the language of reism, there are believing 
things, which can be called “persons” only in a certain secondary sense. Now, if 
we assume that the word “irrational” has a negative meaning and is closely 
related to the claim that irrational believers are blameworthy for making a 
mistake, then one should evaluate believers negatively as irrational persons. This 
is so because it is not possible to separate beliefs and persons, especially if 
Kotarbiński claimed that there are no beliefs but only believers. But it seems that 
it would be irrational from a praxeological point of view to divide people into 
two classes, rational and irrational, since effective and good work presupposes a 
high degree of cooperation between rational non-believers and irrational 
believers. My point is that there could be a tension between the theory of 
rationality of beliefs and the requirements of praxeology. This tension can 
perhaps disappear if we distinguish between logical and pragmatic rationality: 
believers are logically irrational but perhaps they are pragmatically rational. 
Secondly, Kotarbiński described his atheism as follows:
I simply stopped believing in obvious untruths. I saw that all Church teachings are 
groundless. It is good for kids – [he writes] – I do not want to be deluded. I will 
grasp the reality as it is... Let us no longer be deceived (KOTARBIŃSKI [1962], 
p. 10).
We could try to interpret the phrase “it is good for kids” as a suggestion that 
rationality of beliefs depends on someone’s situation and not only on the 
objective conditions of logical rationality. Kotarbiński’s point could be that 
a belief can be good (rational?) for one person and bad (irrational?)in a sense for 
another. But this generous interpretation of Kotarbiński’s words can be easily 
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objected simply by saying that what is “good for kids” is good for nothing. And 
it seems that here again the distinction between logical and pragmatic rationality 
may be useful. Because of some pragmatic reasons, it is a good thing for kids to 
believe in the Church’s teaching, but it does not change the fact that kids with 
respect to their believing in God are logically irrational persons.  
What else could be taken into account when we try to weaken Kotarbiński’s 
unfriendly atheism? – if it is an unfriendly atheism indeed. We can resort to the 
fact that Christian morality was for Kotarbiński a paradigmatic case of moral 
perfection. But, is it really possible to regard Christian faith as “an obvious 
untruth” and, at the same time, to claim that Christian morality is a paradigmatic 
case of moral perfection? Well, perhaps only in terms of psychology, but not in 
terms of logic. 
Having considered some possible ways how Kotarbiński’s atheism could be 
transformed from an unfriendly atheism into a form of friendly atheism, it is 
clear that it is not possible to turn Kotarbiński’s atheism into any form of 
friendly atheism. His atheism is really unfriendly.  
But I think that there is something wrong in the very distinction between friendly 
and unfriendly atheism. A friendly atheism in all its forms can be regarded as 
a form of paternalism and elitism. This paternalistic approach can be formulated 
in the following way: a friendly atheist seems to speak to a believer: your beliefs 
are false or even obviously false and my beliefs are true or even obviously true, 
but I understand why you believe in the obviously false propositions and why 
you cannot stop believing in God. Because I can grasp all these things, I find 
your beliefs untrue but rational. Elitism consists in the fact that atheists consider 
themselves to be a rational minority in possession of the truth. It seems to me 
that, in order to avoid both paternalism and elitism, it would be sufficient simply 
to modify the previously mentioned definition of friendly atheism by saying that 
a friendly atheist is anyone who regards atheism as true but who does not 
exclude that he can be mistaken and theism can be true. And what about 
rationality of beliefs? Well, if we agree that there is a real choice between 
particularism and methodism and that none of the meta-epistemological views 
are obvious, then we may think, if we are atheists, that theists are rational in 
their believing in God, but let as add that it also seems to be the case that, if we 
are theists, we should take atheism as a rational position for exactly the same 
reasons we are ready to treat theism as rational if we are atheists. 
Let us come back to Kotarbiński’s position. If unfriendly atheism is not 
paternalistic, and if friendly atheism is paternalistic, and Kotarbiński atheism 
was not paternalistic, then his atheism is not friendly indeed. But, if it is true, 
there is nothing wrong about it. Why should we think that Kotarbiński’s atheism 
was not a form of paternalism? The very idea of popularizing logical culture, so 
typical for the Lvov-Warsaw School, presupposes that it is possible and valuable 
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grasp the reality as it is... Let us no longer be deceived (KOTARBIŃSKI [1962], 
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objected simply by saying that what is “good for kids” is good for nothing. And 
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their believing in God, but let as add that it also seems to be the case that, if we 
are theists, we should take atheism as a rational position for exactly the same 
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to address logical culture and arguments also to people believing in God, 
because it is possible to convert them to the scientific world-view and to 
atheism. The last presupposition makes sense only if we regard humans as 
rational beings able to think logically. And I think that if we regard people 
as rational beings, even when they have irrational beliefs, we do not take 
a position of paternalism. If we interpret Kotarbiński’s unfriendly atheism in 
such a way, then I think that his atheism has some noble, honest and deeply 
human character. The only problem with the last interpretations is Kotarbiński’s 
reism: there are believers but no beliefs.  
There are two other solutions regarding the problem of rationality of religious 
beliefs, different from those proposed by Rowe and suggested by Kotarbiński; 
these were solutions elaborated by other followers of the Lvov–Warsaw School.
The first of them consists in the distinction between logical and pragmatic 
rationality. This distinction was preferred by Kotarbiński’s disciples Marian 
Przełęcki and Klemens Szaniawski, and now Jacek Jadacki. According to the 
doctrine of two kinds of rationality, religious beliefs are logically irrational but 
they can be rational in the pragmatic sense. The second of them consists in the 
distinction between many kinds of beliefs and the domain of discourse. 
According to the doctrine of the plurality of the domains of discourse, theistic 
and atheistic beliefs are parts of different world-views and as elements of world-
views they can be evaluated with respect to their rationality in the way typical 
for the domain of a world-view but not to science or even philosophy. Beliefs 
which are part of a given world-view are rational if they are coherent with other 
beliefs of a given world-view, they are intersubjectively communicable (that is 
understandable to those people who do not hold those beliefs)and they are not 
incompatible with scientific knowledge. It seems that Kazimierz Twardowski 
had such an idea of rationality of religious beliefs (KLESZCZ [2012], pp. 176–
220). Thus, it is possible that both theism and atheism are rational in this sense, 
provided only that they respect the criteria of rationality crucial for the world-
views. That position was held by Tadeusz Czeżowski and Izydora Dąmbska 
(KLESZCZ [2007], pp. 23–24). Now, it seems that Jan Woleński subscribes to 
this weak notion of rationality of religious beliefs (WOLEŃSKI [1996]).
References 
FUMERTON, R. [2008], “The problem of criterion”, [in:] Greco, J. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Skepticism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 34–52. 
JONBÄCK, F. [2015], “On a very friendly atheism”, [in:] Forum Philosphicum, 20 (1), pp. 65–72. 
KLESZCZ, R. [2007], O rozumie i wartościach, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Humanistyczno-
-Ekonomicznej w Łodzi.
TADEUSZ KOTARBIŃSKI ON GOD AND RELIGION 121
KLESZCZ, R. [2013], Metoda i wartości. Metafilozofia Kazimierza Twardowskiego,
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa. 
KOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1962], Przykład indywidualny kształtowania postawy wolnomyślicielskiej, 
Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa.  
KOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1970], Studia z zakresu filozofii, etyki i nauk społecznych, Ossolineum, 
Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków.
KOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1986a], “Determinizm i fatalizm w obliczu sprawstwa”, [in:] Drogi dociekań 
własnych, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa. 
KOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1986b], Aforyzmy i myśli, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa. 
ROWE, W. L, [1979], “The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism”, [in:] American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 16, pp. 335–341.  
WOLEŃSKI, J. [1996], “Racjonalność jako modalność”, [in:] Woleński J. W stronę logiki, Areus, 
Kraków, pp. 125–136. 
Dariusz Łukasiewicz120
to address logical culture and arguments also to people believing in God, 
because it is possible to convert them to the scientific world-view and to 
atheism. The last presupposition makes sense only if we regard humans as 
rational beings able to think logically. And I think that if we regard people 
as rational beings, even when they have irrational beliefs, we do not take 
a position of paternalism. If we interpret Kotarbiński’s unfriendly atheism in 
such a way, then I think that his atheism has some noble, honest and deeply 
human character. The only problem with the last interpretations is Kotarbiński’s 
reism: there are believers but no beliefs.  
There are two other solutions regarding the problem of rationality of religious 
beliefs, different from those proposed by Rowe and suggested by Kotarbiński; 
these were solutions elaborated by other followers of the Lvov–Warsaw School.
The first of them consists in the distinction between logical and pragmatic 
rationality. This distinction was preferred by Kotarbiński’s disciples Marian 
Przełęcki and Klemens Szaniawski, and now Jacek Jadacki. According to the 
doctrine of two kinds of rationality, religious beliefs are logically irrational but 
they can be rational in the pragmatic sense. The second of them consists in the 
distinction between many kinds of beliefs and the domain of discourse. 
According to the doctrine of the plurality of the domains of discourse, theistic 
and atheistic beliefs are parts of different world-views and as elements of world-
views they can be evaluated with respect to their rationality in the way typical 
for the domain of a world-view but not to science or even philosophy. Beliefs 
which are part of a given world-view are rational if they are coherent with other 
beliefs of a given world-view, they are intersubjectively communicable (that is 
understandable to those people who do not hold those beliefs)and they are not 
incompatible with scientific knowledge. It seems that Kazimierz Twardowski 
had such an idea of rationality of religious beliefs (KLESZCZ [2012], pp. 176–
220). Thus, it is possible that both theism and atheism are rational in this sense, 
provided only that they respect the criteria of rationality crucial for the world-
views. That position was held by Tadeusz Czeżowski and Izydora Dąmbska 
(KLESZCZ [2007], pp. 23–24). Now, it seems that Jan Woleński subscribes to 
this weak notion of rationality of religious beliefs (WOLEŃSKI [1996]).
References 
FUMERTON, R. [2008], “The problem of criterion”, [in:] Greco, J. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Skepticism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 34–52. 
JONBÄCK, F. [2015], “On a very friendly atheism”, [in:] Forum Philosphicum, 20 (1), pp. 65–72. 
KLESZCZ, R. [2007], O rozumie i wartościach, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Humanistyczno-
-Ekonomicznej w Łodzi.
TADEUSZ KOTARBIŃSKI ON GOD AND RELIGION 121
KLESZCZ, R. [2013], Metoda i wartości. Metafilozofia Kazimierza Twardowskiego,
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa. 
KOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1962], Przykład indywidualny kształtowania postawy wolnomyślicielskiej, 
Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa.  
KOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1970], Studia z zakresu filozofii, etyki i nauk społecznych, Ossolineum, 
Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków.
KOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1986a], “Determinizm i fatalizm w obliczu sprawstwa”, [in:] Drogi dociekań 
własnych, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa. 
KOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1986b], Aforyzmy i myśli, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa. 
ROWE, W. L, [1979], “The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism”, [in:] American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 16, pp. 335–341.  
WOLEŃSKI, J. [1996], “Racjonalność jako modalność”, [in:] Woleński J. W stronę logiki, Areus, 
Kraków, pp. 125–136. 
